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Abstract: This paper has two purposes. First, it constitutes an exploration of 
context from the perspective of some prominent historical pragmaticians, 
and/or as demonstrated by representative publications which exemplify a 
particular approach within historical pragmatics (Jacobs and Jucker, 1995; 
Archer and Culpeper, 2003, 2011; Nevala, 2011; Jucker and Taavitsainen, 
2014; Traugott, 2004, 2011; 2012) as well as related disciplines such as 
historical sociolinguistics (Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg, 2003). 
Second, it explores my own (evolving) view in respect to context, often in 
response to the influential work of others; as evidenced in a selection of my 
work (Archer, 2005, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
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1. Introduction 
1995 is a very important year when it comes to the discipline of historical 
pragmatics, not least because it was the year that the edited volume of the same 
name appeared; and that particular edited volume is now regarded by many as 
having kick-started the discipline proper. Nearly twenty years on, this paper 
explores Jacobs and Jucker’s (1995) introduction within Jucker’s (ed.) Historical 
Pragmatics and 11 additional publications representative of different expressions of 
the historical pragmatics discipline (Archer and Culpeper, 2003, 2009; Traugott, 
2004, 2011, 2012; Nevala, 2011; Archer, 2011, 2012, 2014; Jucker and 
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Taavitsainen, 2014) or related disciplines such as historical sociolinguistics 
(Nevalainen and Raumoline-Brunberg, 2003).1 Given the centrality of context2 
within (historical) pragmatics, I focus, in particular, on what the authors have had 
to say about the concept; how these individual discussions, when viewed together, 
signpost an evolution in our (disciplinary) understanding of context, and what 
appears to be shaping these new/changing views. More specifically, I highlight:  
 
 How the discipline allows for explorations of an array of contexts in addition to 
the historical – cognitive, cultural, ideological, linguistic/discursive, political, 
social – dependent on academic positioning. 
 That the methods employed, within historical pragmatics, ensure that we can 
engage in not only form-to-function and function-to-form type studies, but also 
context-to-form and context-to-function type studies. Compare, for example: (1) 
an assessment of the possible functions of a particular interrogative form like 
can you (such as questioning and requesting), (2) an assessment of the possible 
forms that serve the requesting function in a particular language (such as Open 
the window, Can you open the window, It’s hot in here, etc., in English), and (3) 
the “tracing” of “how historical contexts, including the co-text, the genre, social 
situation and/or the culture, shape the functions and forms of language taking 
place within them” (Archer and Culpeper, 2011: 110). By way of illustration, a 
researcher might seek to demonstrate how/the extent to which the questioning 
function, and its various realisations, in times past, was dependent on - and hence 
shaped by - the language used, contextual factors such as the role and goal(s) of 
both the questioner and the recipient, the activity type in which they were 
engaged (dialogue, courtroom interaction, witness deposition, etiquette manual, 
etc.), and the period in question. 
 That we might undertake such methods qualitatively, quantitatively (using 
corpus linguistic techniques), or using a combination of both.  
 That the dataset itself can be an important determining factor in shaping, e.g., 
social categories used within sociolinguistic/pragmatic annotation schemes – 
 
1 Word-limit constraints prevent the inclusion of additional representative papers of the historical 
pragmatic- and historical sociolinguistic disciplines.  
2 Context is a crucial concept in pragmatics, of course, such that it is often understood to be the 
study of what people mean in context, and, hence, the way in which different contexts (cognitive, 
physical/situational, linguistic/discursive, social, cultural, political, ideological, etc.) contribute to 
meaning. For a useful overview, see Chapter 1 of Archer and Grundy (2011). 
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and, in turn, our interrogation of that dataset (Archer and Culpeper, 2003; 
Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg, 2003). 
 That academic positioning – as captured by terms such as sociopragmatics, 
pragmalinguistics, sociophilology, component view and perspective view (all of 
which are delineated in this paper) – can sometimes hide the fact that historical 
pragmatic studies are increasingly demonstrating sociopragmatic, 
pragmalinguistic and/or sociophilological influences (Nevala, 2011; Archer and 
Culpeper, 2011), or component and perspective influences (Traugott, 2011). 
 That, hitherto, we appear to have neglected some contexts within historical 
pragmatics – such as how we might “get inside people’s heads” to determine 
motivations and perceptions (Archer, 2011). This particular aspect picks up on 
the debate as to whether it is possible to tap into the linguistic intuitions of 
speakers of times past, by using “the availability of ethnographic context and of 
an optimally complete behaviour record” (Grimshaw, 1990: 281). It 
necessitates, in turn, that we also consider how optimally complete a behaviour 
record needs to be to prove useful (Archer, 2013). 
2. Pragmatic Developments in the History of English 
Jucker’s (1995) edited collection is a useful starting point, for my purposes, in spite 
of the absence of context (as a heading) in the subject index. Indeed, the concept of 
an interdisciplinary context is evident as early as the book’s sub-title: with 
Pragmatic Developments in the History of English immediately pointing to (by 
presupposing) the efforts made “to make pragmatic linguistics more historical” 
(Archer, 2005: 6) via the bringing together of the disciplines of pragmatics and 
historical linguistics. Jacobs and Jucker also focussed on the interdisciplinary 
context, in their introductory chapter: they explained historical pragmatics as 
equating to the study of how people made use of their language(s), in both times 
past and also across time. But they were careful to emphasize how such usage – to 
be understood appropriately – needed to give just consideration to the given social, 
cultural and historical contexts in which the interactions took place. They made note 
of the pragmaphilological approach, for example, which “describes the contextual 
aspects of historical texts, including the addressers and addressees, their social and 
personal relationship, the physical and social setting of text production and text 
reception, and the goal(s) of the text” (ibid: 11). I pick up on this approach in Section 
3.2. They also referenced – as a means of distinguishing between – Leech’s (1983: 
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10-11) general pragmatics, socio-pragmatics and pragmalinguistics – that is, a 
focus on the general conditions of language use, a focus on the local conditions of 
language use and a focus on the particular linguistic resources of a given language 
respectively. General pragmatics was not discussed further in Jacobs and Jucker, 
and is not developed in this paper. Sociopragmatics and pragmalinguistics are 
delineated, however (see, in particular, Sections 2.1-3.1). 
 
2.1 Sociopragmatic/pragmalinguistic distinction within cross-cultural pragmatics 
 
The sociopragmatic/pragmalinguistic distinction is regularly associated with Leech 
within historical pragmatic circles - thanks, in part, to Jacobs and Jucker’s (1995: 
10) reference to his 1983 publication. However, it was first made by (Leech’s then 
PhD student) Thomas (1981, 1983), in order to explain the different levels at which 
pragmatic failure might occur in a cross-cultural context (Leech, 1983: 18, footnote 
13; Culpeper, 2010: 72). I have opted to note this here for two reasons. First, Jacobs 
and Jucker (1995) rightly emphasised that it was contrastive studies, relating to 
different languages, which led the way to studies of language use at different periods 
in the history of the same language. Second, there is an acceptance, within the cross-
cultural pragmatics field, that an interlocutor’s pragmatic knowledge must be both 
pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic in orientation (regardless of language). 
Consequently, pragmalinguistics and socipragmatics are seen as complementary 
(rather than distinct fields). Consider pragmatic competence. Pragma-linguistically 
speaking, pragmatic competence means having at our disposal, first, social and 
culturally-recognised strategies for realizing communicative intentions - such as 
conventional indirectness - and, second, the linguistic tokens necessary to 
implement these strategies in our communications, in ways that will be understood 
by our interlocutors (Roever, 2004: 284). For example, a speaker might opt to 
perform a conventional indirect request in English, today, by using the can you form. 
Pragmatic competence, sociopragmatically speaking, requires our having 
knowledge of social norms, that is, knowing “what … you do, when, and to whom” 
in a given context of utterance (Fraser et al., 1981). For example, having some 
knowledge of mutual rights and obligations, as well as any taboo behaviour to avoid 
(Thomas, 1983), and - if we are thinking about requests, as before - the potential 
effect of contextual and/or interpersonal variables such as power differentials, social 
distance, and degree of imposition (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This helps to 
explain why people tend to find requesting the time or the salt, using the can you or 
similar form, less daunting than asking their line manager, Can you sort out a raise 
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for me? Even so, there are times when Can you tell me the time? would be deemed 
inappropriate (and potentially rude): for example, when uttered by a student to a 
lecturer 10 minutes into a 50-minute workshop. When we talk about pragmatic 
competence, then, we mean the ability to map pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic 
knowledge onto each other, and be able to use that knowledge appropriately under 
the constraints of a given communicative situation or context. 
2.2 Sociopragmatic/pragmalinguistic distinction within historical pragmatics 
In their introductory chapter, Jacobs and Jucker (1995: 10-11) went on to suggest 
that general pragmatics, as a framework, would not lend itself as easily to historical 
pragmatics, as the sociopragmatic and pragmalinguistic frameworks would do. In 
hindsight, their suggestion that researchers will therefore tend to adopt the latter 
approaches, when undertaking their historical pragmatic studies, seemed itself to 
trigger investigations that were typically sociopragmatic or studies that were 
typically pragmalinguistic. Typical sociopragmatic studies within the field, for 
example, became ones which traced how a particular speech act function such as 
apologizing or insulting, or another interactional phenomena relating to 
im/politeness, had changed the form (or forms) it employed (see, e.g., Jucker and 
Taavitsainen, 2000) – all the while emphasizing the need to study such examples of 
local language use from a specific time in the past in a way that took account of the 
social and cultural contexts influencing the interaction (Archer, 2005: 7). This 
explains the strong association between the sociopragmatic approach and “the more 
Continental European conceptualization of pragmatics as the study of the use of 
language in its wider social and cultural context” (Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2014: 
7). Typical pragmalinguistic studies within historical pragmatics, in contrast, 
became ones which traced how a particular form had undergone functional change 
(usually over time). Particularly popular studies, in this respect, are those which 
trace the grammaticalisation / pragmaticalisation / subjectification of a particular 
linguistic form or language-internal feature (see, e.g., Traugott and Dasher, 2005) – 
in other words, they share the Anglo-American (micro) focus on “pragmatic 
motivations for language change” (Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2014: 8).    
3. Sociopragmatic investigations with pragmalinguistic interests 
Although the sociopragmatic versus pragmalinguistic orientation is very much 
evident in historical pragmatics, even today, there are studies which demonstrate 
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both a sociopragmatic and pragmalinguistic influence. In fact, two such 
representative studies – Nevala (2011) and Archer and Culpeper (2011) – were 
published in an edited collection explicitly devoted to Historical Sociopragmatics 
(Culpeper, ed.).  
3.1 Person reference in Late Modern English 
Nevala (2011) investigates how pronouns and nominal terms such as friend were 
used to refer to third parties in Late Modern English letters and journals – including 
those penned by Agnes Porter, an eighteenth-century governess whose own 
pragmalinguistic patterns indicated (interesting contextual shifts in) interpersonal 
familiarity/distance. For example, when referring to children that she loved as 
though they were “her own” (2011: 68), she would tend to use endearment terms 
such as darlings, dear creatures, little cherubs and pretty elves. When addressing 
her own friends or friends of friends, in contrast, she would tend to adopt one of two 
patterns (or a combination of both): my X friend, where friend might be pre-modified 
by adjectives such as old, new and good; and/or honorific title (such as Miss or Mrs) 
plus first name or surname. Hence, we find examples in her writing such as Miss 
Jane my old friend and My good friend Mrs Pinnock. Other writers in Nevala’s 
dataset used terms which allowed them to strategically alternate between social 
positionings: and, as Marmaridou (2011: 98) has observed, they seemed to do so in 
ways that took note of any “prevalent social and societal constraints” – thereby 
ensuring the sociopragmatic focus of Nevala’s paper. As well as using friend to 
indicate friendship and intimacy, for example, writers also used it “as a social 
“softener”, as “a booster of the recipient’s authority”, “as a device to affirm the 
addressee of the writer’s loyalty” and, later in the eighteenth century (in line with 
the emergence of the middle class), as a strategic means of raising their profile. By 
way of illustration, some writers promoted themselves as “an intimate friend” of 
“people with societal prestige in order to appear more socially influential” 
themselves (Nevala, 2011: 74-5).  
3.2 The sociophilological approach 
A second investigation within the same edited collection – by Archer and Culpeper 
(2011) – introduced a new approach into historical pragmatics: that of 
sociophilology.  As the authors explain, this approach shares some similarities with 
pragmaphilology, in the sense of seeking to describe not only linguistic form and 
pragmatic function but also “the contextual aspects of historical texts, including the 
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addressers and addressees, their social and personal relationship, the physical and 
social setting of text production and text reception, and the goals of the text” (Jacobs 
and Jucker, 1995: 11). Indeed, the sociophilogical approach involves “describing or 
tracing how historical contexts, including the co-text, the genre, social situation 
and/or the culture, shape the functions and forms of language taking place within 
them” (Archer and Culpeper, 2011: 110). There are some important differences 
between the two, however, not least that the sociophilological approach is not 
limited to synchronic concerns, as pragmaphilology appears to be, and can proceed 
from context to form or context to function (something that was not made clear, 
when Jacobs and Jucker described pragmaphilology). In addition, the socio- part of 
the label, sociophilology, ensures that, much like sociopragmatics, sociophilology 
has a fundamental interest in the “‘local’ conditions of language use” (cf. Leech, 
1983: 10).  
 Archer and Culpeper go on to argue that it is their methodological point of 
departure – of using a combination of corpus-linguistic (CL) techniques 
(specifically pragmatic annotation, as exemplified by the Sociopragmatic Corpus 
(1640-1760), in conjunction with keyness analysis)3 – which makes a focus on 
diachronic as well as synchronic concerns possible.  
3.2.1 Pragmatic annotation (within the Sociopragmatic Corpus)  
The Sociopragmatic Corpus is a 120-year subset of the Corpus of Early English 
Dialogues (1560-1760), and consists of trial texts and drama texts which have been 
manually annotated for sociopragmatic phenomena (i.e., each participant’s role in 
the interaction, as well as their status, sex and age (where known)). The 
sociopragmatic scheme used was devised by Archer and Culpeper (2003), and 
includes speaker information and addressee information at the utterance level. The 
authors argue that this was the best way of capturing the dynamism of the speech 
within their dataset (cf. corpora which include sociolinguistic information in the 
header of a text). They also wanted the results of their electronic searches to provide 
(on-screen) sociopragmatic information relating to the participants themselves (i.e., 
their status, sex, age and role), at the same time as providing a sense of what the 
participants said (or, in the case of the trial texts, were reported as saying).  
 Suffice it to say, researchers can easily make use of categories such as status, 
sex, age and role to identify, retrieve and analyse the interaction sequences of 
 
3 The use of CL methodologies within historical pragmatics is yet another example of how 
historical pragmaticians regularly work across linguistic disciplines (see Section 2.3). 
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particular dyads, using computational software/CL techniques. For example, Archer 
and Culpeper (2011) used Wmatrix (a web-based software tool for corpus analysis 
and comparison4) to undertake key part-of-speech investigations, key word 
investigations and key semantic field investigations in respect two sets of dyads 
from the Sociopragmatics Corpus: 
 
(1)  Male examiners conversing with (male/female) examinees.  
(2)  Masters or mistresses conversing with (male/female) servants. 
 
The keyness approach involves automatically creating and then comparing two lists 
(be they words, part-of-speech categories or semantic domains) as a means of 
discovering the most statistically-significant items within the first list when 
compared with the second list, where the first list constitutes the particular dataset 
of interest, and the second list, a comparative corpus. Archer and Culpeper were 
seeking to identify the statistically-based style markers of examiners, examinees, 
masters, mistresses and servants, that is, those linguistic features which appear to 
characterise these specific groups. They thus paid particular attention to each 
group’s use of personal pronouns, interjections, imperative verbs, politeness 
formulae, etc. For example, they noticed that male and female examinees overused 
the first person, statistically speaking. But they also showed some interesting 
differences. For female examinees mainly used I as part of narrative reports, in line 
with their role as witnesses. Hence, we get example utterances such as I never saw 
them together and I went to see the prisoner at Newgate.5 Many of the male 
examinees in the Sociopragmatic Corpus were defendants, however: which helps to 
explain why, in their interactions, there are instances of I being used in conjunction 
with hedging devices, modality, equivocation strategies, etc. Hence, we get 
examples such as the following, when a male examinee flouted the maxim of 
Quantity (Grice, 1975) as a means of emphasising what he did not do/say to others: 
I can not answer directly, I do not say if he was acquainted with me, but I say this, 
that he did declare he did not know me.6  
 
4 See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ for details. 
5 A female examiner by the name of Jane Finch also regularly used the idiosyncratic pattern, said I 
instead of I said.  
6 Arguably, the opening, I can not answer directly, also flouts the Manner maxim: for, although it 
has the appearance of an opt-out, it was a means of achieving a level of hedging, in context. 
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3.2.2 The contextual shaping effect(s) of the datasets used 
Archer and Culpeper (2003) emphasise that they spent extensive periods digging 
into primary sources – i.e., each text within the Sociopragmatic Corpus – in order to 
work out what the variables should be for each of the fields they use (Role, Status, 
Sex, Age). They also dug into secondary sources as a means of retrieving relevant 
information in respect to, for example, the ages of famous participants (involved in 
some of the trials); typical life spans within this 120-year period; and contemporary 
understandings of the status system at this time. Their status variables, in particular, 
required a detailed knowledge of the period as well as the work of near-
contemporaries such as King - who published the 1695 criteria relating to ‘Ranks, 
Degrees, Titles and Qualifications’ - and Harrison – who published the 1577 criteria 
relating to ‘titular nobility, knights, esquires’. 
 Terttu Nevalainen and Helena Raumolin-Brunberg have been particularly 
influential when it comes to the study of (similar) sociolinguistic phenomena in an 
historical context. Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg (2003) were involved in the 
development of the Corpus of Early English Correspondence (1400-1800) and, 
more importantly, given the focus of this section, in the development of models via 
which to capture the (organisation of) social networks in the early Modern English 
period. They ultimately decided on a model based on four groupings: the Upper 
Ranks, Social Aspirers, Middle Ranks and Lower Ranks. I compare these groupings 
with the status categories used by Archer and Culpeper (2003), in Figure 1 (below). 
I do so to show that how we see the world (as researchers) is not only influenced by 
well-known socio-historical categories such as gentry – or even contemporary 
perceptions of the world that we have researched – but also the type of data we are 
working with when we begin to develop our categorisation schemes: 
 
N&R’s (2003) status categories 
 
A&C’s (2003) status categories 
Upper Ranks 
 
Social Aspirers 
 
Middle Ranks 
 
Lower Ranks 
Nobility 
Gentry 
Professions 
Other Middling Groups 
Ordinary Commoners 
Lowest Groups 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of status categories 
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By way of illustration, Nevalainen, Raumolin-Brunberg and their team of 
researchers were working with correspondence data. As the middle and upper 
groupings of society were more likely to be (fully) literate, during their period of 
interest, they originally took a lot of care when teasing out these particular categories 
– before ultimately deciding on a model that, although far less nuanced, allowed for 
more general patterns of language usage to be identified (cf. Rissanen, 1989). In 
contrast, Archer and Culpeper (2003) were working with speech-related texts taken 
from trials and comedy plays representative of the later Early Modern English 
period. These datasets were found to contain too many groups to subsume under the 
general term Lower Ranks as Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg had done. Archer 
and Culpeper therefore decided to include separate categories for (as a means of 
distinguishing between) Ordinary Commoners and the Lowest Groups. Like 
Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg, they opted for (two) broad categories as 
opposed to more specific categories (common seamen/soldiers, servants, paupers, 
the unemployed, vagrants, etc.) as a means of avoiding the Mystery of Vanishing 
Reliability7 (Rissanen, 1989). 
4. Recontextualising decontextualised results 
For (historical) pragmaticians, how a particular form is functioning – in a given text 
or interaction – cannot be truly understood without also considering the particular 
context of utterance. This might be in respect to:  
 
 Time, place, cultural schemas - and, arguably, worldviews - in operation, etc. 
 What happens immediately before and immediately afterwards. 
 Who is interacting with whom, and for what purpose(s).  
 
Yet, when we use corpus linguistic techniques to detect (historical) pragmatic 
phenomena, we are effectively breaking down texts such that words, phrases, etc., 
become de-contextualised. By way of illustration, I have sought to locate an 
“aggression space”, historically, using the previously mentioned Wmatrix tool, 
based on a corpus of 200 historical courtroom trial extracts (Archer, 2014). Wmatrix 
was the tool of choice because  
 
 
7 The Mystery of Vanishing Reliability dictates that annotation schemes which are too detailed will 
tend to tell us very little about the more general patterns of language usage (Rissanen, 1989). 
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(i) the 232 SEMTAGs underpinning Wmatrix are premised on the notion of 
a semantic field, and Jucker and Taavitsainen’s (2000) pragmatic space 
is meant to be analogous to a semantic field (albeit one which depends 
on several contextual factors – i.e., formal, creative, ad hoc, 
conventional, particular, speaker attitude, etc.);  
(ii) Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) have used this notion of a pragmatic 
space to trace phenomena that overlap with the notion of an “aggression 
space”: they traced the development of insults over time, based on the 
above-mentioned contextual factors. 
 
Archer (2014) is included in an edited collection, which introduces Diachronic 
Corpus Pragmatics (Taavitsainen et al, eds.): a field of research that combines 
historical linguistics, corpus linguistics and pragmatics. As Jucker and Taavitsainen 
(2014: 3, 11) explain, although these academic disciplines have been perceived as 
being “more or less incompatible” in the past, their recent coming together marks a 
thrust in historical pragmatics towards investigations which share similarities with 
the older “philological view of textual scholarship”, albeit in a new 
“form…refreshed by new tools and innovative combinations of methodologies 
backed up by statistics”. In their introduction to this edited collection, Jucker and 
Taavitsainen also explain how corpus linguistics and pragmatics, in particular, share 
an interest in variability – but that, within the latter discipline, variability is often “a 
more dynamic notion” (2014: 8), in practice. As Jucker and Taavitsainen state, 
pragmatic variability is inter-related with negotiability (a second core concept of 
pragmatics) – not least because of “the range of possibilities from which choices can 
be made at any given moment in the course of interaction”. This leads Jucker and 
Taavitsainen to suggest, in turn, that each utterance in an interaction can effectively 
create “a new context” (2014: 8): hence the importance of recontextualising any 
decontextualised tool-generated results, where pragmatic meaning is our focus. 
Consider my three-step approach for automatically identifying potential evidence of 
verbal aggression in the Old Bailey trials (Archer, 2014). As a first step, I focused 
on the words and phrases captured within six pre-chosen SEMTAG categories of 
the Wmatrix system8 (Speech Acts, Im/Politeness, (Lack of) Respect, Evaluation: 
Good/Bad, Evaluation: True/False and Anger). As a second step, I scrutinised the 
results gleaned via the expand context component within the tool – and, where 
 
8 The Wmatrix system is designed to be able to identify words/phrases associated with – so that they 
might be automatically assigned to –137 part-of-speech tags as well as the aforementioned pre-
defined SEMTAGs.  
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possible, the original documents themselves – as a means of discarding any “false 
leads”. As a third step, I ensured that any (semantic) meanings assigned by Wmatrix 
were sensitive to the period they represent in addition to being relevant in context. I 
found, for example, that although Wmatrix automatically assigned all instances of 
politely to the politeness semtag, S1.2.4+, it was used in one context in a question 
that sought to suggest ‘the covert nature of the art of pick-pocketing’ (Archer, 2014: 
288): Did not you hear the foreigner say no force was used, but that his watch was 
taken most dexterously and politely? (Trial of John Wheeler, 18 April 1787 
[t1780418-96]).  
The need for historical sensitivity to meaning-in-context has recently been 
addressed more comprehensively via the Semantic Annotation and Mark Up for 
Enhancing Lexical Searches (SAMUELS) project (amongst others).9 As part of 
SAMUELS, the 232 semantic categories within Wmatrix have been mapped to 
4,033 themed categories derived from the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (Kay et al., 2009).  This means that researchers can now (better) 
discover, quantitatively speaking, which words/phrases were used to perform a 
particular pragmatic or discursive function (such as discourtesy and verbal 
aggression) throughout the ages (see, e.g., Wattam et al, 2014; Archer and Malory, 
2017). The historically-sensitive tool should still be viewed as an investigative aid 
only, nonetheless – especially when exploring pragmatic phenomena from an 
historical period or in historical texts (such as courtroom records) where the concept 
of meaning included (and arguably encouraged) alternative interpretations.  
5. A coming together of the component and perspective views 
In Section 2.2, I touched on the Anglo-American approach, and its associations with 
pragmalinguistics, and the Continental-European approach, and its associations with 
sociopragmatics Yet, we might equally link Anglo-American scholars to the 
component view of historical pragmatics, and Continental-European scholars to the 
perspective view of historical pragmatics, where the former focuses on language-
internal features and the latter, on both language-internal and language-external 
factors (Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2010: 5) – but as a means of understanding 
“patterns of intentional human interaction”, at a specific period in time or across 
time periods, “as determined by the condition of society”, “the historical 
 
9 The SAMUELS project was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in conjunction 
with the Economic and Social Research Council (grant reference AH/L010062/1). 
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developments of these patterns, and the general principles underlying such 
developments” (Jucker 2008: 895). For example, in my own work, I have adopted 
what might be regarded as  a perspective view to investigate how a particular 
linguistic activity – such as the cross-examination of a witness – both shaped and 
was shaped by the role assigned to each participant, their allowable contributions, 
the historical period in question, etc. (Archer 2005: 7; Archer 2012). In Archer 
(2012), for example, I reveal how the aforementioned lawyer, William Garrow, 
operated in a judicial system that – for much of his career – prevented him (and his 
fellow defence lawyers) from giving opening statements or making closing 
arguments on behalf of clients. As such, the only opportunity he and other late 
eighteenth-century defence counsels had to signal (albeit indirect) messages to 
jurors was during the (cross-)examination phases of a trial – when, that is, the Court 
allowed them to speak. Garrow is well known, amongst historians, for having 
developed questioning techniques that afforded him the opportunity of not only 
gleaning information from unfriendly witnesses, which might help his own client’s 
case, but also commenting on the apparent (in)adequacy, (non-)clarity, (ir)relevance 
or (non-)truthfulness of their responses. In one trial, for example, he linked the 
victim-prosecutor (William Grove, the elder) to illicit activities – via, first, the 
mention of moonlight men and smugglers and, second, via suggesting that Grove 
was friendly with such men. He also framed Grove as a perpetual drunkard via his 
yes-no question, Was you as drunk that night as you are now, how much have you 
been drinking to-day? When the victim-prosecutor insisted he had “drank no gin”, 
Garrow persisted with his drunkard frame in ways that suggested Grove was lying 
(“What other spirits?”). 
 Elizabeth Close Traugott is perhaps the most well-known Anglo-American 
scholar whose studies typically adopt a component view. She is particularly known 
for paying specific attention to ‘the discourse contexts in which [semantic] changes 
occur’ – that is the immediate co-text – as a means of explaining the role that implied 
meaning and pragmatic inferencing played in bringing about changes in meaning 
which – over time – became grammaticalized (2004: 539, 560). The reason a close 
investigation of the immediate co-text is so important to researchers adopting a 
component view of pragmatics is immediately evident in Traugott’s (2012) be going 
to investigation. Traugott was interested in determining whether there was any 
evidence of the phrasal verb being used in pragmatically ambivalent ways once the 
grammaticalization process – of motion verb to future marker – had taken place. She 
found that its pragmatic ambiguity was very much dependent on or related to its co-
occurrence with terms such as carry, do, buy, visit, etc. In fact, she highlights 
14    
twenty-six pragmatically ambiguous tokens within her two datasets (the Helsinki 
Corpus and Old Bailey records) which, in turn, represent 18 specific types 
(dependent on the above collocates). 
 The above study is not Traugott’s only study of trial data. In fact, she has 
investigated how trial reporters used (in)direct addresses in order to  “construct and 
engage with their audiences” (Traugott 2011: 69). This particular study, however, is 
more typical of the perspective view of pragmatics – because of a focus on language-
internal features (i.e., address terms like Reader and the public) and language-
external factors (i.e., the hegemonic ideologies underpinning such terms and, hence, 
shaping reader perceptions). For example, Traugott’s discussion of the following 
extract from a 1674 trial makes mention of an ideology which sought to safeguard 
the social order by encouraging contemporaries to converse about unruly passions 
in ways that ultimately regulated them (see also Brewer 1997: 102):  
 
READER, Wherein canst thou more experience thy self for the ordering of a 
good Conversation, than by seeing the follies of those, who either by their own 
idle or extravagant living are forced to seek out those ways and means, which 
either are destructive in themselves, or purchase shame and destruction in their 
end? (29 April 1674, f16740429-1). 
6. Mental aspects of pragmatic theory 
Traugott’s (2011) emerging interest in reporters’ attempts to influence the 
perceptions of their readers is particularly interesting when viewed in light of an 
earlier comment that she has made in respect to modern researchers not being able 
to “tap linguistic intuitions of speakers several hundred years ago” and thus having 
to “look to competence for use” (Schwenter and Traugott, 1995: 244). The problem 
of “get[ting] into people’s heads” is not peculiar to historical studies, of course. 
Rather, it is an issue for any linguist and also for any interlocutors engaging in talk: 
hence the general acceptance that the “availability of ethnographic context and of 
an optimally complete behaviour record permits analysts to make such inferences 
and attributions which are ‘for-the-most-practical-purposes’ [...] no less plausible 
than those of actual participants” (Grimshaw, 1990: 281).  
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 The cognitive context nonetheless remains somewhat under-researched 
within historical pragmatics (and, potentially, for historical linguistics more 
generally).10  
6.1 Clashing reality paradigms and representational frames 
My curiosity in respect to what might be gained were we to seek to systematically 
explore ways of understanding the cognitive/psychological traits of others, as part 
of our historical analyses, has led to my developing an interest in interlocutors’ 
reality paradigms and representational frames, as evidenced in their interactions 
(Archer, 2002, 2011).  From my perspective, a reality paradigm equates to “the 
systems of beliefs [and] values … by reference to which a person or a society 
comprehends the world” (Fowler 1986: 130), that is, their truth filter. 
Representational frames, in contrast, relate to the way(s) in which interlocutors opt 
to “represent the character traits, ideas and opinions of and even statements made 
by others” (Locher and Watts 2008: 99, n9). Consider the case of Edward Coleman, 
who was tried for Treason in November 1678. When being questioned, Coleman 
felt the need to highlight a “dreadful” truth, from his perspective - “the violent 
prejudices that seem[ed] to be against every man in England that confess’d to be a 
Roman Catholick” (Trial of Edward Coleman, Corpus of English Dialogues)  - 
adding that although a Roman Catholic might be “innocent”, he would nonetheless 
be found guilty. That is to say, the reality paradigm of the country at large was such 
that they could not discern the truth before them. Note, then, that Coleman’s turn 
equated to an indirect means of not only establishing his innocence, but of also 
highlighting a ROMAN-CATHOLIC-EQUALLED-TRAITOR reality paradigm 
that he believed to be prevalent at that time, and which he believed required a form 
of “positive discrimination” from the judges to subvert. In his response, Judge 
William Scroggs initially reassured Coleman that he would receive a “fair, just, and 
legal Trial”,  
 
You need not make any preparations for us in this matter, you shall have a fair, 
just, and legal Trial; if Condemned, it will be apparent you ought to be so; and 
without a fair Proof, there shall be no Condemnation.  
 
But he went on to assert: 
 
10 My thanks to a reviewer for highlighting that the cognitive context remains largely under-
researched within historical linguistics. 
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Therefore you shall find, we will not do to you, as you do to us, blow up at 
adventure, kill people because they are not of your perswasion; our Religion 
teacheth us another Doctrine, and you shall find it clearly to your advantage. We 
seek no mans blood, but our own safety. But you are brought here from the 
necessity of things, which your selves have made; and from your own actions you 
shall be condemned, or acquitted. 
 
The implications of this statement seem to confirm that Coleman was right to fear 
that justice would be coloured by a ROMAN-CATHOLIC-EQUALLED-TRAITOR 
reality paradigm on the part of the judges. For the opposition between we and you 
effectively positioned Coleman with those Catholics who blew up at adventure, 
kill[ed] people, etc., and Scroggs, with those whose Religion taught what, for him 
at least, was a more tolerant Doctrine. Notice, too, the guilt implicature within his 
claim that Coleman had been brought before the Court because of his own actions 
(i.e., a necessity...which he had made) and the ordering of condemned and acquitted 
when stating the possible consequences of those actions.  
The interaction between Coleman and Scroggs also provides us with 
interesting clues as to the identities being constructed for Coleman. According to 
Scroggs, and many of those listening on, he was a criminal; yet, Coleman tried hard 
to imply that he was, in fact, an “innocent but persecuted man”. Indeed, in 
Coleman’s very next turn, he flouted the Quantity maxim to emphasise that he was 
telling the truth. 
 
Pris. … I promised I would confess all I knew. And … what I said in 
Prison is true, and am ready at any time to Swear and Evidence, 
that that is all the truth … 
L.C.J. It is all true that you say: but did you tell all that vvas true? 
Pris.  I know no more, than what I declared to the Two Houses. 
L.C.J. […] Do you believe, there vvas no Negotiation after 75.  because 
vve have not found them [=letters]? Have you spoke one wword to 
that? Have you confessed, or  produced those Papers and Weekly 
intelligence? When you ansvver that, you may have credit; vvithout 
that, it is impossible: For I cannot give credit to one vvord you say, 
unless you give an account of the subsequent Negotiation.  
 
However, judges’ “guilty” paradigms could be so strong, in times past, that they 
could not – or would not – interpret implicatures as defendants and, on occasion, 
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witnesses intended them to be interpreted (Archer, 2002). In fact, in this particular 
case, the judge’s response – “it is all true that you say: but did you tell all that vvas 
true?” – intimated that Coleman was being economical with the truth. Once again, 
Coleman sought to imply that he had told everything he knew, but the Lord Chief 
Justice remained unconvinced. In fact, his turn demonstrates his strong belief that 
there had been negotiations with the French after 1675 – and – until Coleman 
produced evidence – which, if we’re to believe Coleman’s version of events, did not 
in fact exist – then the judge explicitly signalled that he could not “give credit to one 
vvord” of Coleman’s evidence. To the judge’s credit, he did address Oates - the man 
who had implicated Coleman - to make sure that Coleman was “condemned by plain 
Evidence of Fact” --- in order “that Mr Coleman may be satisfied in the Trial”. But 
– even in this turn – the judge’s reality paradigm played a part 
 
Mr Oates, we leave it to your self to take your own way, and your own method; 
only this we say, here’s a Gentleman stands at the Bar for his life; And on the 
other side, the King is concerned for His life; you are to speak the truth and the 
whole truth; for there is no reason in the world that you should adde any one thing 
that is false … you have taken an Oath, and you being a Minister, know the great 
regard you ought to have of the sacredness of an Oath; and that to take a man’s 
life away by a false Oath is murther, I need not teach you that. But that Mr. 
Coleman may be satisified in the Trial, and all people else by satisfied, there is 
nothing required or expected, than downright plain truth, and without any arts to 
conceal, or expatiate, or to make things larger then [sic] in truth they are; he must 
be condemned by plain Evidence of Fact.  
 
Notice, in particular, Scrogg’s comment regarding Oates’s occupation, which 
suggests the judge’s mindset was such that he believed being a (protestant) 
“Minister” equated to being truthful. A longer exploration of Coleman’s trial would 
allow us to see that Coleman was the victim of a philosophical strategy that is still 
evident in today’s adversarial courtrooms: that, if someone is put under enough 
pressure, they will tell the truth, or the truth will emerge despite the teller (Lakoff 
1990) - even when that particular version of the “truth” does not, in fact, exist.  
Ironically, if Scroggs had have pushed Oates more, when questioning him, instead 
of “leaving it to [him] to take [his] own way”, he may have learned that Oates had 
been a member of a Jesuit house in France, until he was expelled; and had also been 
accused of perjury and put in prison (but managed to escape).  
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6.2 Framing Others 
The late nineteenth-century defamatory libel trial brought by Oscar Wilde reveals 
how reality paradigms and representational frames were sometimes 
used/manipulated, in the context of the historical courtroom, in order to frame 
someone as deviant. Wilde took the Marquis of Queensberry to trial in 1895, 
because the latter had intimated that Wilde was a homosexual. At that time in 
England, homosexuality was deemed to be both a moral and legal crime.  Wilde 
held a different view, however: and Carson (the lawyer for Queensberry) used these 
differences in worldviews to suggest that Wilde was not only deviant but extremely 
dangerous to Victorian society.11 By way of illustration, when Carson sought to 
determine whether Wilde thought one person could adversely affect another, Wilde 
initially asserted that, as far as he was concerned, there was no “influence, good or 
bad, from one person over another”. At which point, Carson asked 
 
C:  A man never corrupts a youth? 
W:  I think not. 
C:  Nothing he could do would corrupt him. 
W:  Oh, if you are talking of separate ages it is nonsense. 
C:  No sir, I am talking common sense. 
W:  Do not talk like that … personally, as a mere philosophical point, I don’t think 
- I am talking of grown human beings - that one person influences another. I 
don’t think so. I don’t believe it. 
C:  You don’t think that one man could exercise any influence over another? I may 
take that as a general statement? 
W:  As a general statement, yes. I think influence is not a power that can be 
exercised at will by one person over another: I think it is quite impossible 
psychologically. 
C:  You don’t think that flattering a young man, telling him of his beauty, making 
love to him in fact, would be likely to corrupt him? 
W:  No.                  
 
(Cross-examination of Wilde, Wednesday pm 3rd April 1895 [Holland 2004.: 102]) 
 
 
11 Being able to convince a jury that Wilde’s behaviour could adversely affect Victorian society 
was important as it helped to confirm that Queensberry’s actions were “for the public benefit”; 
something which had to be proven legally for Queensberry to be found not guilty of libel. 
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Notice, in particular, Carson’s use of repetition, here, as well as his assertion that he 
was not talking “nonsense”, as Wilde suggested, but rather “talking common sense”. 
Wilde did not seem to notice the danger in continuing this discussion from a 
philosophical or psychological standpoint. But it was dangerous – as it allowed 
Carson to re-frame “a general statement” about someone’s ability to influence 
another into a question that specifically allowed Carson to mention activities – such 
as “flattering a young man, telling him of his beauty, making love to him” – which, 
as far as Victorian England were concerned, were the kinds of activities that were 
“corrupt[ing their] youth”. Hence, by answering “No” to this question, Wilde 
showed himself to have a reality paradigm that very much clashed with the country’s 
world view. 
7. Conclusion 
Historical pragmaticians use context as an overarching term which actually brings 
together – and thus has the potential to allude to – an array of contexts in addition 
to the historical: be it cognitive, cultural, social, (Verschueren 1999: 7, 109) 
ideological and/or political. Some of the latter (historical, ideological, political) 
point, in themselves, to multiple contexts (consider a diachronic study, for example, 
or an investigation of a political text-type such as pamphlets, which often 
necessitates an understanding of clashing political and ideological views). In this 
paper, I began by discussing a sixth context: that of the academic/disciplinary 
context. In particular, I explored how the academic/disciplinary context can (pre-) 
determine the theories and/or methodologies researchers draw upon when making 
sense of their datasets (Sections 2.1-5). However, I have also suggested that some 
of the labels used to explain academic or disciplinary positioning are best seen today 
as highlighting a primary (rather than the only) focus within a particular sub-field. 
For many studies, within historical pragmatics, combine the sociopragmatic and 
pragmalinguistic perspectives (Sections 3-3.2) or the component and perspective 
views (Section 5). This begs the question as to whether these terms are still needed 
– and explains my use of parentheses around “socio” in the title of this paper. 
 Some of the newer approaches to emerge over the past 20 years – in particular, 
sociophilology – have deliberately sought to make context their investigative 
starting point, rather than language form or interactive function, whilst also 
advocating the use of corpus linguistic techniques (which, in turn, promotes a focus 
on quantitative as well as qualitative findings within the field: Section 3.2). This 
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often means concentrating on several contexts simultaneously, such that researchers 
remain sensitive to the shaping potential of the linguistic, socio-cultural, political 
and historical contexts (i.e., the roles established by the activity type(s)/genres/ 
communities of practices/organisational practices, and any prevailing ideologies 
which might have underpinned them, etc.). The increasing use of corpus linguistic 
techniques has been matched by the development of (historical) pragmatic 
annotation schemes (Section 3.2.1), the re-development of automatic analysis 
systems (designed with modern data in mind) so that they handle historical data 
more sensitively (Section 4) and a (welcome) return to an older “philological view 
of textual scholarship”, albeit in a new “form … refreshed by new tools and 
innovative combinations of methodologies backed up by statistics” (Jucker and 
Taavitsainen, 2014: 3, 11). This said, it is important to understand that the dataset 
itself can be an important determining factor in shaping, for example, the social 
categories used within sociolinguistic/pragmatic annotation schemes – and, in turn, 
researchers’ interrogations of that dataset (Section 3.2.2).  
 I have suggested that, within historical pragmatics in particular, we have been 
attentive to most of the contexts highlighted above; but that there is more to do when 
it comes to finding systematic ways of exploring motivations and perceptions (see 
Sections 6.-6.2). This is perhaps the most controversial context to explore given the 
difficulties associated with “get[ting] into people’s heads” and the current debates 
in respect to intentionality, within (historical) pragmatics. Following Grimshaw 
(1990: 281), one way forward is to accept that it is possible to tap into the linguistic 
intuitions of speakers of times past, by using evidence from the “ethnographic 
context” as well as an “optimally complete behaviour record” (Grimshaw, 1990: 
281) – but only if we give some thought to what constitutes an optimally complete 
behaviour record within historical pragmatics (Archer, 2013). For, according to 
Labov (1994: 11), we are forced to make “the best use of bad data”, that is, to 
reconstruct (the meaning of) interactions within a given activity type, genre and/or 
community of practice – and assess the evolution of such discursive practices over 
time – using written documents only. This undoubtedly makes 
psychological/cognitive investigations more difficult. I would advocate, 
nonetheless, that concepts such as reality paradigms and representational frames 
appear to make them possible.  
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